Dear Friends,
      With my respectful compliments. Given below is my article for your kind perusal pl.
                           With regards
                                        Pak sponsored Terrorism.
                           Nation is paying for the blunders of 1947
     Another series of bomb blasts in Hyderabad, killing fourteen and injuring many more: Again visits by the VIPs, very brave statements. That is the end of it other than praying to God and crying on the shoulders of U.S. President that it does not happen again. India would not have to face this bloody terrorism unleashed by our hostile neighbour from across the border, if after the tribal invasion of Kashmir, Pt. Nehru had allowed Indian army to march on to Muzaffarabad and not get himself black mailed by Mountbatten, his Commanders in Chief and their devious designs. British were hostile to ‘Hindu India’ and were the bosom pals of Jinnah and his Pakistan. So Mountbatten as Governor General of India looked after the interests of Pakistan rather than India and never wanted Pakistan to be defeated decisively.
      See what does Gen. Akbar Khan who led the tribal invasion say in his book Raiders in Kashmir? “One glance at the map was enough to show Pakistan’s military security would be seriously geopardised if the Indian troops came to be stationed along Kashmir’s western border. Once India got the chance, she could establish such stations any where with in a few miles of the 180 miles long vital road and rail route between Lahore and Pindi [RawalPindi]. In the event of war those stations would be dangerous threat to our most important civil and military lines of communications. If we are to concentrate our strength at the front, we would give India a chance to cut off Lahore, Sialkot. Gujrat and even Jhelum from our military base at Pindi. The possession of Kashmir would enable India if she so wished to take the war directly to Hazara and Murree more than two hundred miles behind the front.”

   What an unfortunate India was? See the observations of General Sir Douglas Gracey, Commander in Chief of Pak. Army on India’s push towards northwest. Josef Korbel who was acting chairman of the U.N. Commission on Kashmir has observed in his book ‘Danger in Kashmir’ “  General Sir Douglas Gracey, the Commander in Chief of Pakistan army, gave a detailed presentation to the Commission regarding the military situation and elaborated upon the reasons which had led the Pak Govt. to send its army to Kashmir, when in May 1948, the Indian army began to approach the borders of Pakistan, he felt she could no longer remain passive. “ The Pakistan army’s intelligence service, he reported was in possession of reports indicating that the Indian army had been preparing itself for a general offensive with the aim of finishing off the Kashmir campaign. The plan was to reach strategic places in the northwest and southwest areas of the state very close to the Pakistan border” “Had the plan been accomplished, the Pakistani authorities maintained, it would have meant disaster for Pakistan herself. First, the Indian Govt would have put before the whole world the possession of Kashmir as fait accompli. Secondly, it would have inundated Pakistan additional several hundreds of thousands of refugees who would have further disrupted her chaotic economy. Third it would have placed the Indian army on the long Pakistan border and with in thirty miles of the strategic railway leading from Peshawar through West Punjab to Lahore. Pakistan would then have been at the mercy of India which as the people in Karachi were convinced, desired nothing less than to remove Pakistan from map. Fourth, to weaken Pakistan from with in, the Indian push toward the north would allow the Indian army to reach the boundaries of the Pakistani states, Chitral and Swat and further establish a physical link with the leaders of the anti-Pakistan movement for independent Pathanistan, with whom Indian Govt was suspected to be in contact. It would have opened the opportunity for the pincer movement against Pakistan by India and Afghanistan, the later having shown a suspicious interest in the Pathan movement. Fifth, the occupation of the lower waters of three Kashmir rivers flowing to Pakistan would have placed India in a position to strangle Pakistan economically. A land of 35 million acres had been irrigated by 16 canals before partition. Now the boundry lines cut through both rivers and canals but their waters would still irrigate 19 million acres of land in Pakistan. The occupation of these rivers and their dams by the Indian army and the eventual diversion of their waters through canals would have been meant Pakistan’s quick economic death”

    Prem Shankar Jha, a veteran who has written a lot on Kashmir is right when he says in his book ‘Kashmir 1947- The origins of dispute’ that “ Pakistan achieved its essential purpose of the tribal invasion of Kashmir. Pakistan pushed India back by many miles all along the entire length of Lahore- Rawal Pindi rail and road link; it had physically separated Indian Kashmir from the NWFP. It also blocked India’s capability to open a second front in the far north to make Lahore indefensible So one can say that Pakistan emerged a victorious”
      As pointed out by Narendra Singh Sarila, a distinguished diplomat in his book ‘The Shadow of the Great Game. The untold story of                             India’s Partition’ that “General K.M. Cariapa had planned to reconquer Mir Pur and Muzaffarabad situated on the Pakistan frontier. Butcher in Delhi with the concurrence of the Defence committee had however denied Cariapa fresh troops for carrying out the assault. The argument was that such an attack would expose East Punjab to a Pakistani counterattack” Mountbatten being the chairman of the Defence Committee, which in itself was unusual, could manipulate any decision.
   As per Sarila “Butcher admitted to Gracy, the Pakistan Commander in Chief that he had no control over Cariappa but hit upon an intriguing scheme  to now stop the advance of his own army”. “Graffety Smith British High Commissioner in Karachi reported to London the arrangements reached privately between the Commanders in chiefs of the armies of two dominions. General butcher indicated to Gracey that ‘he had no wish to pursue an offensive in to what is effectively Azad Kashmir-controlled territory, ie to Mirpur and Poonch sector …The object of these arrangements is to reach a situation in which each side will remain in undisputed military occupation of what are roughly their present positions…The Pakistani Prime Minister is aware of their exchanges, I have reported above but I understand he feels unable at present to endorse this officially” Mountbatten desperately wanted to neutralize Indian military initiatives and said so in so many words to General Gracey, the Pakistani Commander in Chief who visited Delhi on 2 may 1948 that “ if we could get the two Governments to…feel themselves thoroughly militarily impotent, then this appeared to be the best chance of reducing the risk of war after my departure”
  Graffety Smith confirmed this assurance when “On 20 November 1948, he wired the Common Wealth Relations Office in London that ‘Butcher had told Gracey: ‘There would be no (repeat no) attack on Mir Pur or at any stage (repeat stage) attack on Kotli or Bhimber
       The then Brig. L.P.Sen who led the Indian troops against the Pak forces and the tribals has said in his book ‘Sender was the Thread’ that “161 Bde riding the crest of wave was ready and willing to move forward and make a resolute attempt at achieving the objective” “Unfortunately the military hierarchy in New Delhi did not appear to share the objective. “ The only conclusion that one can draw is that the route of the enemy in the battle of Shelatang shattered not only the tribesmen but other quarters as well. When Baramula fell with in 24 hours of shelatang and the Bde set off for Uri, its advance had to be arrested and so one Bn was withdrawn without relief. “ Army headquarters’ handling of the operation in Kashmir in 1947-48 leaves more than little room for speculation whether the formations deployed were really intended to score a decisive success” Sardar Patel was right when he told Mountbatten that the Army Hqrs was obstructing the field Indian officers from pursuing their objectives of war.
       Alex Von Tunzelmann has quoted in her book ‘Indian Summer’ that  “Richard Symonds, who served on the United Nations Commission in Kashmir, described the farcical situation where the British Commanders in Chief of the Indian and Pakistani forces would ring each other up as if they were arranging a tea party: ‘If you bomb this, they would say, ‘we shall shell that.”
        Again another very in depth analysis of the events of 1947 by Christopher Thomas in his book ‘Fault Line Kashmir’ that “After regaining Uri and Baramulla, the Indian army stopped. “ Indian forces given adequate men, fuel and ammunition by Army Headquarters could probably have taken Muzaffarabad late day capital of POK. Instead Delhi indicated its willingness for the ceasefire. Pakistan was extremely happy to sign one because India moved to such a superior military position. It was also terrified that it could declare open war and attack Pakistan” Ceasefire came in to being on Jan.1-1949, was exactly at the same positions where General Gracy said it should be. Was it just because of Sheikh Abdullah? “Indian analysts have said “Advance was halted because of shortage of fuel, ammunition and other supplies. Could these shortages be deliberately created to justify to its more hawkish elements its decision to advance no further. Nehru could have calculated that after securing valley, Hindu and Sikh towns of Poonch, Rajouri as well as the strategic town of Kargil, there was no point in capturing territory that will always be hostile to India and would vote against it in plebiscite” He further says “as the raiders pursued their advance, Lord Mountbatten threw his loyalties behind Nehru although he was equally determined that Pakistan should not be crushed in war to the extent that it would never be viable as a country
      However Indian army did succeed to some extent in thwarting the designs of Mountbatten and General Butcher. Brig. C.B.Khanduri who has written a biography of General Kariapa says “During March 1948, General K.M.Kariapa, the new GOC in C was able to reoccupy Jhangar and beat back powerful Pakistani attack on Naoshehra. In April, the Indian troops entered Rajouri town and thus the Jammu Naoshehra communication lines were restored. Cariappa had taken care not to inform the army headquarters about his operational plans. He further says “Cariappa had to fight ‘two enemies’, Army Headquarters headed by Roy Butcher and the Pakistan army headed by Frank Meservy”
        In 1935, British executed a 60 years lease agreement with Hari Singh transferring the sole responsibility of defence and administration of Gilgit -Baltistan to British. With the announcement of Mountbatten plan on 3 June 1947, these principalities were handed back to Maharaja with the devious plan of getting them under the control of Pakistan. Christopher has observed again in his book Fault Line Kashmir “Whether or not there was a British conspiracy to separate Gilgit and Baltistan from the rest of Kashmir is unclear. But it is entirely possible that the British incited the revolt to ensure that this strategically vital region came under Pakistan’s jurisdiction in the expectation that Pakistan would cooperate in the Western defence pacts to block Russian ambitions, which in fact is precisely what happened. British wanted it to go to Pakistan as India could not have allowed it to be used for spying or mounting attack on the then USSR.”
    Alistair Lamb, a pro Pakistan writer has written in ‘Incomplete Partition’ that “Pakistan would retain a direct territorial contract with China to be of immense geo-political significance in years to come. India would not acquire the direct territorial contact either with Afghanistan or NWFP and thus miss the consequent opportunities for intrigues with Pathans both in and outside Pakistan”
    If we could have recaptured Gilgit –Baltistan, India would have had direct access to Afghanistan through the Wakhan Corridor, located in northeast of Afghanistan. We could have also access to North West Frontier Province of Pakistan and Tajikstan. As observed by General Akbar Khan a la General Tariq of tribal invasion in his assessment, we would have been in a position to strike deep with in Pakistan and take the war to Hazara and Murree more than two hundred miles behind the front in case of any mischief by Pakistan. That is our misfortune and we will have to live with it.
                                         Former Director General of Police Punjab

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